By Park Tae-woo

The recent power succession scheme in North Korea from Kim Jong-ll to his third son, Kim Jong-un, strongly supports the plausibility of a more prolonged unification dilemma South Korea could face in the coming decades.

Unprecedented in world history, especially, in the socialist-communist bloc, the totalitarian, parochial regime of North Korea is going through a very tough and difficult power succession scheme for the small upper power-class of the ruling Workers’ Party in the most closed, rigid society in the world, not for ordinary citizens' natural benefit.

Why is this kind of unreasonable, out-of-date power transfer scenario possible in the North in the 21st century?

Historically, unified empires on the vast Chinese continent have controlled the politics of the Northeast Asian region, putting many small states including Korea under the direct or indirect influence of the Chinese empire. Korea has been heavily influenced by the Chinese Confucian culture and politico-cultural institutions, thereby, somewhat being a proud part of a Chinese culture.

The traditional power structure of Northeast Asia with one external actor, powerful Chinese empires, has made it possible for Korea to keep its status immune from competition and interference from other countries, especially by accommodating the mechanism of a dominant role player in this region.

China's military strength protecting Korea from any kind of threat as a guardian state had been acceptable logic in Korea until the early 19th century. We could define this kind of power structure in Northeast Asia as a "China-led hierarchical system."

Following the end of Japanese colonial rule on the Korean Peninsula from 1910-1945, which was a "Japan-led hierarchical system," the power structure in the Northeast Asia was immediately replaced by a confrontation model between the divided two Koreas under the bipolar international system of the Cold War, led respectively by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, when Russia replaced the role of the former Soviet Union, the international order surrounding the Korean Peninsula was composed of an incomplete balance of power led by the United States, Russia, China and Japan, supported by a dynamic, multilateral framework of the United Nations.

In this context, the South Korea-U.S. alliance and North Korea-China brotherhood ties function as the paradigm to maintain the status quo on the peninsula.

When we talk of the coming age of the G2 through the expanded role of China, we could agree that this new structure could definitely influence the coming unification process with much more political and diplomatic momentum, possibly, moving China toward advocating the third-generation power succession plan of North Korea.

Thus, this will ultimately delay the possible unification process by deterring the collapse of the North Korean dictatorship. This is quite a realistic analysis.

Witnessing the past big brother role of China toward North Korea in the last two decades, during which starvation among ordinary people was made known to the outside world along with confrontation due to the “axis of evil” logic raised by the former U.S. President George W. Bush, the nuclear development issue on North Korean soil has drawn negative attention. We have been compelled to reach the natural conclusion that China’s “negative” could possibly deter any natural, positive integration process for the two Koreas, by economically and militarily aiding the poverty-stricken and dilapidated North against the will of the international community.

It is a big tragedy that the Chinese Community Party (CCP) had an angry reaction to the recent awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to dissident and jailed Chinese pro-democracy activist, Liu Xiaobo. China even showed antipathy toward potential political liberalization with uneasiness toward Chinese accommodation of universal values for a liberal democracy.

This has been clearly demonstrated in the process of rejecting the Western-style individual-oriented freedom approach. Despite Chinese dissident leaders' shouting for more political freedom, it is unlikely that the CCP will adopt a political line of flexibility and more individual freedom in the foreseeable future.

It is actually our sincere desire that China will be a nation of more liberal democratic values and virtues in thinking of its long-term national interests on the Korean Peninsula; which means that ultimate unification would definitely comply with a future vision of a more regionally integrated and economically prosperous China whose politics will be more harmony-oriented.

This kind of liberal approach will make China move forward to secure more economic prosperity in regions close to the peninsula. China’s North Korea policy is, thus, required to be in complete harmony with the spirit of the U.N. Charter stressing peace, mutual cooperation and coexistence.

China’s equidistance diplomacy toward the two Koreas, based upon a short-term, realistic calculation of its own interests, would bear little historical significance as long as Beijing strongly backs Pyongyang as its small brother by approving a third-generation power succession.

Thinking of the majority of 24 million ordinary North Koreans who are deprived of basic human rights to guarantee their human dignity, even thinking of 3 million deaths caused by starvation because of the lack of food, the expanded role of China in Northeast Asia must function in an affirmative way based on vision and optimistic promises.

Otherwise, it could possibly raise strong doubts that China is not helping the Koreas move toward unification. China's negative attitude will only enhance its own negative national image in the world community, entrapped by the logic of a negative, selfish hegemony.

Dr. Park Tae-woo is honorary consul of East Timor in Korea and visiting professor at the department of diplomacy, National Chengchi University in Taiwan. He has recently lectured on special topics on international relations, Korean external relations, Chinese political economy and Chinese external relations this semester in Korea University and Kyung Hee University. He also serves as external affairs director for the Korean Political Science Association and for the Korean Association of Politico-diplomatic History this year. He can be reached at t517@naver.com